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Creating Opportunities for Successful Design
Decisions in Uncertain Environment.

It is widely recognized that properly conducted early part of the new product
development process – conceptualization or fuzzy front end – is vital for new product
success. Accurate and timely information during the early phases of the New
Product Development (NPD) and design processes reduces rework and lead-time,
enables better planning, execution and results. Therefore, the aim of the
conceptualization phase can be articulated as in providing information package
according to which a decision could be made whether a concept is to be developed
further to a product or not. What is the role of the conceptualization in situations
where adequate information is not available during the early phases? How should the
design and NPD processes – and the conceptualization as a key phase of them – be
organized in such highly uncertain and dynamic environments?

Anssi Tuulenmaki
Helsinki University

To address the topic, I present three generic NPD/design process approaches,
which vary according to uncertainty they are confronting. In the most predictable
environments Stage-Gate type of models are effective process models. The basic
assumption there is that all the key issues could be defined, planned and scheduled
during the conceptualization. The required information exists already; it is only
matter of gathering and analyzing. The earlier the concept could be frozen the
faster the process.
In case of higher levels of uncertainty, accurate information about the key features,
performance variables and customer preferences is not readily available during the
very front end of the process. Thus, NPD/design processes must be very flexible to
reflect information acquired close to a launch. It is known that essential pieces of
information are still missing for final judgment but it will be known later on, after
certain pieces of product/system in hand are created. In other words, developers
and designers know enough to start working but not enough to decide all the
features of the concept. Quite opposite compared to the first approach, the closer to
a launch (i.e. later) you are able to freeze the concept the better.
In the most uncertain and dynamic environments information is not available before
an actual product is launched and emerging market is created. Then, even the first
launched products could be seen as concepts as thus part of the conceptualization
phase. There, managers have enough information to commit experimenting or
conceptualizing, but they do not know during the initial development/design process
what kinds of concepts could turn out to be winning ones. I examine several
methods and business implications related to this last approach. In addition of
literature review and conceptual frameworks, I present a few cases, e.g. from Nokia,
that give practical insights.
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CREATING OPPORTUNITIES FOR
SUCCESSFUL DESIGN DECISIONS IN
UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENT

1. Introduction
In new product development (NPD), it is widely recognized that properly
conducted early part of the process is vital for new product success (Cooper
1999, Khurana & Rosenthal 1999, Montoya-Weiss & O’Driscoll 2000, Ulrich &
Eppinger 2000). Accurate and timely information during the conceptualisation or
fuzzy front end reduces rework and lead-time, enables better planning, execution
and results (Khurana & Rosenthal 1999, Moenart et al 1995). Therefore, the aim
of the conceptualisation phase can be articulated as in providing information
package according to which a decision could be made whether a concept is to be
developed further to a product or not (Kim & Wilemon 2002, Ulrich&Eppinger
2000). The required information for justified decision making includes, at least,
product’s competitive advantage, technology feasibility, markets, customers,
timing, risk assessment, manufacturability considerations, and costs (e.g.
Khurana & Rosenthal 1999, Kim &Wilemon 2002). Naturally, all those issues are
also closely related to product’s design.
However, highly uncertain, rapidly changing environments pose the fundamental
challenge for the early phases of the NPD. How should the NPD process - and
the conceptualisation as a key phase of it – be organized in highly uncertain
environments in which the required, accurate information is not available during
the early phases of the process? What is the role of the conceptualisation in such
situations? How firms can create opportunities for successful design decisions in
such situations?
To address the topic this paper is organized so that first I discuss how
uncertainty affects NPD processes (and thus design process). The discussion is
based on literature review and desktop studies about new product introductions.
Secondly, I present several methods how conceptualisation could be done in
dynamic and uncertain environments. Each method has its advantages
depending on iteration costs, concept/ product characteristics and market
dynamics. I present a real-life example how Nokia is reducing uncertainty in
mobile communication business. Nokia example is based on interviewing
managers at Nokia Mobile Phones and Nokia Research Center. Finally, I
conclude the discussion by linking the conceptualisation in uncertain
environments to broader views of capability development and design process.

2. Uncertainty and new product development processes
Many authors have provided process models for new product development
(Cooper et al 2002, MacCormack et al 2001, Rothberg 1981, Ulrich & Eppinger
2000) as well as technology development and commercialisation (Eldred &
McGrath 1997a&b, Jolly 1997, Sheasley 1999, Siadad 1996, Wood & Brown
1998). The most widely used process models are variations from the Stage-Gate
process (Cooper et al 2002).

Stage-Gate models, which rely on predictable information and thus anticipation,
are effective in more traditional, stable markets where customer preferences and
technologies are well known. The basic assumption there is that all the key
issues could be defined, planned and scheduled during the conceptualisation.
The earlier the concept could be frozen the faster the process.
In more uncertain, complex and dynamic environments the accurate information
about the key features, performance variables and customer preferences is not
readily available during the very front end of the process. Uncertainty has direct
implications to a NPD process. Because the lack of early information the key
factors for successful result are planned flexibility and reaction capabilities
(MacCormack et al 2001, Verganti 1999).
The challenges more uncertain environments pose for Stage Gate type of
models, which assume predictable environment, can be illustrated by considering
a simple model of development consisting of three separate stages (Fig 1). The
first stage is concept development (where the overall concept is defined and the
product architecture developed), then detailed design (where individual modules
are designed and tested), and finally system-level design (where these modules
are integrated into a complete system and tested). The first challenge stage-gate
type of model faces is that it assumes all information about potential design
choices is known or can be discovered during concept development. In uncertain
and dynamic environments, however, firms cannot predict every potential design
choice up-front. There is, therefore, a greater need to keep the product concept
open to change. To achieve this stages 1 and 2 must overlap (see Fig 1),
implying that detailed design must start before the specification is complete.
First
integration
New information

Concept
frozen
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DETAILED DESIGN
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Figure 1; flexible NPD model ( MacCormack et al 2001)

Complex, systemic products pose the second challenge for the stage-gate type
of models. Feedback on how the product performs as a system is not obtained
until late in a project, when the functionality in each module has been fully
developed. In uncertain environments or with radical innovations, there is a need
to gain feedback from ”early” system-level tests, implying that stages 2 and 3
must overlap (hence the first test of system-level performance occurs before the

modules are complete). Moreover, in the most flexible processes, also stages 1
and 3 will overlap, thereby allowing feedback from system-level tests to have
direct impact on the evolution of the product concept.
In the most challenging end of the uncertainty-continuum are discontinuous or
radical innovations in dynamic, rapidly changing environments where
technologies, markets and customer preferences are emerging, fluctuating and
mostly unknown. Since product development is “a very uncertain path through
foggy and shifting markets and technologies” (Eisenhardt & Tabrizi 1995)
traditional market testing offers limited utility (Leonard-Barton 1995, Lynn et al
1996). Similarly, being flexible during the initial NPD process is not enough.
Rather, one has to launch something to the marketplace before accurate
information regarding customers and features could be obtained. There, even the
first launched product(s) could be seen as concepts and thus part of the
conceptualisation phase. The learning is gathered from the real marketplace and
according to that knowledge new variants are developed and launched. The key
in this kind of iterative process is the speed and cost of market and technology
knowledge accumulation rather than being right with the first launch.
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Figure 2; uncertainty and most suitable NPD/conceptualisation approach.

Figure 2 summarises the three approaches described above. Boxes and
rectangles denote NPD phases, and arrows starting from certainty-bar and
crossing the phases illustrate changes in certainty levels. So, in predictable
environment the earlier you are able to freeze the concept the faster the rest of
the product development could be executed. Comprehensive information is
basically known from the start – the proper conceptualisation is mainly matter of
careful gathering and analysing of existing information. The certainty level does
not increase substantially during the process because it is high enough already in
the beginning.

More uncertain world necessitates quite opposite - the closer to a launch (i.e.
later) you are able to freeze the concept the better. It is known that essential
pieces of information are still missing for final judgement but they will be known
later on, after certain pieces of product/system in hand are created. In other
words, developers and designers know enough to start working but not enough
to decide all the features of the concept. Certainty level does increase
substantially during the development process.
In very uncertain and dynamic environments information for effective
conceptualisation have to be created by experimenting in a real marketplace with
several concept-like products. There, managers have enough information to
commit experimenting or conceptualising but they do not know what kinds of
concepts could turn out to be winning ones. As Lynn et al (1996:17) argued,
“probing with immature versions of the product makes sense if it serves as a
vehicle for learning.” Certainty level does not increase substantially before the
first version is launched and real-life experiences are being analysed. In the next
section, conceptualisation in very uncertain environments will be discussed in
greater detail.

3.Methods for conceptualisation in highly uncertain
environments
Sometimes, even the most flexible NPD processes are not enough for an optimal
design and market result with the first launched product. The market success
might not be determined by the first generation product launch but by several
launches. The goal of expeditionary marketing (Hamel & Prahalad 1991) is
similar to the goal of conceptualisation - to determine the precise direction in
which to aim i.e. the particular configuration of product functionalities that
customers are really valuing, winning business logic, and the distance to the
target i.e. the technical and other hurdles to overcome to achieve the
combination of price and performance that will open up the new competitive
space. As Hamel & Prahalad argued, there are two ways to increase the number
of hits in new business development. One is to try to improve the odds on each
individual bet (hit rate). Stevens & Burley (2003) suggested that individual
personality-related issues are strongly affecting new business development
success, especially during the very early stages when only few people are
involved in the process. Selecting the right people for the right roles seems to
improve the hit rate dramatically. The other way to increase the number of hits is
“to place many small bets in quick succession and hope that one will hit the
jackpot” (Hamel & Prahalad 1991). If the goal is to accumulate understanding as
quickly as possible, a series of low cost, fast paced market incursions –
expeditionary marketing – can bring the target more rapidly into view. When the
target is finally known it is time to move from conceptualisation or
experimentation mood to business-as-usual product development. Then, serious
money is put in each of the projects with an assumption that every project is
paying the invested money back.

Leonard-Barton (1995) divided experimentation strategies in three groups. In
“Darwinian selection” (Fig 3) a firm launches multiple new product offerings
simultaneously to see which has the greatest market appeal. Traditionally,
Japanese companies have been active in this approach. For example, Sharp
tried several different types of PDA models simultaneously in 1993-1994
(Leonard-Barton 1995), Sony developed hundreds of Walkman models to detect
customer preferences (Leonard-Barton 1995, Sanderson & Uzumeri 1995), and
Toshiba introduced 24 laptop computer models between 1986-1990 (Dhebar
1995). Interestingly, Intel who is nowadays well known of its speed of replacing
the old microprocessors by improved versions (Cusumano & Gaver 2002) started
the microprocessor business by experimenting with several types of
microprocessors simultaneously. In 1992, nine different microprocessor types
were available at the same time varying in performance levels, prices, end-user
targets etc. (Dhebar 1995).
a) DARWINIAN SELECTION STRATEGY
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Figure 3; learning from market - Darwinian Selection and Product Morphing strategies
(modified from Leonard-Barton 1995:208).

In “the Product morphing” (also in Fig 3) strategy initial product features evolve
as consumers adopt, adapt, and implement the new technology offering. This is
very close to probe and learn process described by Lynn et al (1996). They
documented how General Electric used this approach in CT scanning business
during 1975-1985 and Motorola in emerging handheld cellular phone business
during 1973-1984.
In “the Vicarious experiments” strategy (see Fig 4), firms learn from competitors
as well as from their potential customers. The best elements are then

incorporated into new offerings. This strategy includes the learning from others
mistakes and thus “wait and see how market evolves” attitude. This is surely the
cheapest kind of market experimentation – unless the pioneers succeed to create
dominant standards and/or dominant designs (Anderson & Tushman 1990) or if
the market is strongly affected by network externalities and/or high switching
costs (Moore 1999). Then, the result might be the technological or market lockout
(Schilling 1998).
c) VICARIOUS EXPERIMENTS
X Product

Firm A 1

Performance,
functions,
design
variants

Product
definitions
1

discontinued

Market feedback
& learning

Firm B

2

2
Market feedback
& learning

Firm C

Firm A

3

3

4

4
TIME

Figure 4; leaning from market - Vicarious Experiments strategy (modified from LeonardBarton 1995:208).

Figure 5 presents another possible strategy, titled as “Variants strategy”. There,
experimentation (or, when used in more mature markets, segmentation) is based
on variants from the original “mother product”, the product 1. Instead of starting a
new product project from scratch, the variants 1-2 and 1-3 are using parts of the
Product 1 but new technology, new design and/or new features are introduced on
top of it, rapidly and cost effectively. Thus, one could argue that
conceptualisation continues after the mother product is launched. Best parts
(from customers point of view) or well-developed parts (from manufacturers’ point
of view) of the mother product are used in several variant launches, which aim to
probe evolving customer preferences and to detect potential new concept ideas.
Naturally, this approach calls for a high degree of modularity in product
architectures.

d) VARIANTS STRATEGY
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Figure 5; leaning from market - Variants strategy.

4.Finding optimal conceptualization strategy in highly uncertain
environment
How many new versions of concepts companies should introduce? Optimal
amount of introductions depends on iteration costs, product/ concept/ market
characteristics and competitive pressures. Sorenson (2000) showed that in
markets with few rival products, the importance of monitoring and learning from
market with higher variety of products outweighs the benefits of culling. Similarly,
product variety is more valuable when uncertainty makes the accurate prediction
difficult. Further, the benefits from concepts decreases when the cost of iteration
(i.e. cost of learning) increases.
When competitive pressures are low and cost of iteration is high, as was the
case with GE’s CT scanning business (Lynn et al 1996), then the product
morphing strategy might be the optimal. The company had ten years opportunity
window to introduce new, improved but very expensive models and to find the
winning concept.
If products and concepts are expensive to develop but a market is more dynamic,
product morphing might be too slow approach. Instead, the variants strategy
might be more appropriate since there companies are using the expensive/ well
developed parts in several variant models and just add new technologies or
features on top of it. Of course, there is a delicate trade-off between gains and
risks of such approach since developing a product architecture that is modular
and flexible enough to accommodate such add-on variants could be an
expensive and time-consuming initiative.
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Figure 6; choosing optimal experimenting/ conceptualization approach.

When expected gains from new concepts are lowest, - i.e. the costs of iteration
are high and yet dynamics of the new market seem moderate - then it makes
sense to let others to blaze the trail. Thus the vicarious experiments strategy
might be the most appropriate. A company might introduce something to a new
market but the emphasis is on market observation.
If concepts/ products are relatively cheap to develop, as was the case with Sony
Walkman (Sanderson & Uzumeri 1995) then the Darwinian selection strategy
might be appropriate. The gains from high variety of concepts decreases when
amount of competing offering or cost of iteration increases.
In reality, firms are often using some dynamic combination of abovementioned
strategies. Nokia provides a good example of that (Fig 7). When introduced in
2001, Nokia 5510 looked like no other previous Nokia phone in spite of the fact
that it inherited most of its components and technical solutions from the standard
Nokia 3300 series phone. Nokias’ designers diminished 5510’s phone-like
features to make the gadget looking more like an entertainment or a gaming
device (interviews and Nykänen 2001). On top of the old components, Nokia
added new keyboard, a MP3 player and more memory for games and MP3s. By
utilizing Variants strategy this way Nokia was able to test customers’ reactions
about new positioning, design, features, sales channels etc. These experiences
gained helped Nokia to develop three new phone categories (Roope Takala
Nokia Research Center): Nokia 3300 series media phone, Nokia N-Gage gaming
phone and Nokia 6800 series business phone.
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Figure 7; how Nokia is reducing uncertainty (from Roope Lahtinen Nokia Research Center 2003).

4. Conclusion
Conceptualisation in highly uncertain environment is a challenging task. The
methods and strategies presented in this paper are based on the assumption that
the most effective, and often, the only way to get enough information for justified
decision making in highly uncertain environments is to introduce products to the
evolving marketplace. In all of the strategies for conceptualisation in the highly
uncertain environments, what counts most is not being right the first time but the
pace and cost at which the company recalibrate its product offering and learns
from a new market. Faster learners might gain competitive advantage in two
general arenas. Firstly, because experimentation gives them first-hand
experience about customer preferences and value expectations as well as
technologies and functionalities they are most likely in a better competitive
position to develop higher volume products into that specific product-technologymarket domain. In other words, they know exactly where to aim with the higher
volume products. Secondly, companies active in experimentation might gain
advantages in experimentation and conceptualisation itself, i.e. capability
development. They might develop capabilities of faster learning and faster
adaptation thus becoming more effective when facing uncertainty and constant
changes.
Design plays a key role when creating the winning combinations in new market
situations. Design process, similar to any other process, which is aiming to create
something new, always contain some degree of uncertainty. Iteration and

experimentation, which are vital for new market creation, are also in the core of
the design process. When used effectively, design process is thus one of the key
capabilities when operating in uncertain environments.
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